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ABSTRACT
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON NETWORK INTRUSION
DETECTION SYSTEMS
by
Peng FU
A signature database is the key component of an elaborate intrusion detection
system. The efficiency of signature generation for an intrusion detection system
is a crucial requirement because of the rapid appearance of new attacks on the
World Wide Web. However, in the commercial applications, signature generation
is still a manual process, which requires professional skills and heavy human effort.
Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining methods may be a solution to this problem.
Data Mining and Machine Learning algorithms can be applied to the network traffic
databases, in order to automatically generate signatures.
The purpose of this thesis and the work related to it is to construct a feasible
architecture for building a database of network traffic data. This database can then
be used to generate signatures automatically. This goal is achieved using network
traffic data captured on the data communication network at the New Jersey Institute
of Technology(NJIT).
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The emergence of the Internet has profoundly and permanently changed the shape of
the world. One of the greatest advantages Internet brings is its accessibility, which
brings vast and diverse information to users with just a mouse click. With this
greatest advantage comes its inherent opposite side, the greatest threat. While it
facilitates the usage by all the legitimate users, accessibility also provides convenience
for illegal users to probe into networked systems, steal sensitive information or even
disable the entire World Wide Web for days. This could happen at any moment to
any computer on the Internet. When considering this problem, the biggest issues are
when do the intrusions happen, where do they come from and who commits them.
These problems are well known to any security professional. Since the early development of data communication protocols developers considered functionalities and
efficiency much more than they did network security issues, almost all established and
widely used protocols "genetically" contain insecure weakness. This makes solving
the above problems much more difficult. It will be a long run for the whole world to
have a safe World Wide Web.
With the dramatic growth of the Internet, these kinds of intrusions happen
more and more frequently. According to CERT [1], in the Year of 1988 there were
only 6 security incidents reported; in the Year of 2002, there were 82,094 incidents;
and as of August 2003, there have been 76,404 (Figure 1.1). Since 1988, there have
been a total of 258,867 incidents that may involve one site or even hundreds of
thousands of sites. Furthermore, with the evolution of technology, the malicious
computing techniques and tools have been constantly progressing. Subsequently,
intrusions are more complicated and it requires more and more professional skills to
find them.
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Figure 1.1 Trends of reported security incidents, data obtained from CERT[1].
This severe situation leaves us in great need of countermeasures for network
intrusions. First of all, security is a policy issue that has to be always kept in mind
by the people who administrate data communication networks. Without the proper
regulations and management on security related matters, even the finest technologies
can become useless investment. Security policies for data communication networks
can also reinforce the technical strength in many ways. For example, publicly emphasizing or even exaggerating that user activity is being closely monitored by administrator may deter an intrusion attempt before it happens.
However, policy management and psychological strategies are not enough to
prevent the system from being invaded by experienced attackers. Technically, antinetwork intrusion tools that are capable of helping an organization or network secure
its information are still needed. These tools could be used to detect an intruder,
identify and block the intruders, support investigations to find out how the intruder
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got in, stop the exploit that the intruder used from being used by future intruders,
and provide forensic evidence to carry out legal actions.
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is the right tool to meet all these requirements.
It utilizes technologies coming from various fields of computer science to discriminate
inappropriate, incorrect, or anomalous activities. Detection is not the only function
an IDS has. Today's advanced IDSs have the ability to automatically and aggressively counteract intrusions.

CHAPTER 2
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS

The concept of Intrusion Detection was created by James Anderson in 1980 [2] [3].
Based on the difference between the emphases and methodologies, intrusion detection
falls into two categories: anomaly detection and misuse detection.

2.1 Detection Methods
2.1.1 Anomaly Detection
In anomaly detection, observed behaviors are compared against expected normal
usage profiles that are developed for individual users, groups, applications, or system
resource usage. Activities that are not defined as "normal behavior" are considered
anomalies[4]. Instead of defining what is "bad" for the system, anomaly detection
defines what is "good" , which keeps the control rules in a reasonable size. In practice,
thresholds are set to defining acceptable behavior (for example, the acceptable failed
logins during a certain period of time), which provides a clear line between "normal"
and "anomaly" . In order to cover all the major aspects of a system, normal activities
for individual user and user groups have to be properly and independently profiled.
This process will include analyzing and specifying allowed usage for system recourses
and executables. All the users and groups are expected to comply with the system
recourse assignments and privileges on executables. Activities otherwise will be
treated as anomalies and subject to interruption.

2.1.2 Misuse Detection
In spite of comparing to historically "normal" usage and acting on the entire
unknown, misuse detection essentially locates "bad behaviors" based on the
summarized and abstracted description of known attack activities [5]. Misuse
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detection is signature-based detection. A signature is a pattern that represents
possible attacks, which can be found in network traffic. After careful analysis of raw
network traffic data, rules are generated to identify a single event that represents
a threat to system security, or a series of events that represent a prolonged attack
scenario. Obviously, misuse detection requires comprehensive knowledge of a system,
especially its weakness and vulnerabilities. Misuse detection could be implemented
by developing expert systems, reasoning models, state transition analysis systems, or
neural networks. Applying various Knowledge Discovery or Data Mining algorithms
to misuse detection model may be a new promising way of making the detection
fast, accurate and efficient [10].

2.2 Intrusion Detection Systems

Both anomaly detection and misuse detection can be adopted into a single architecture to form an intrusion detection system (IDS). Because of the steadily
increasing number of reported computer security incidents, intrusion detection
systems have gained a fast-growing market. For example, Cisco[23], ISS[24],
AXENT[25] and NFR[26] all market commercial systems for intrusion detection.
Intrusion Detection System has the following functions [6]:
• Monitoring and analyzing user and system activity
• Auditing of system configurations and vulnerabilities
• Assessing the integrity of critical system and data files
• Recognizing activity patterns reflecting known attacks
• Statistically analyzing activity for abnormal patterns
• Facilitating operating-system audit-trail management, with recognition of user
activity reflecting policy violations
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A general model for intrusion detection system contains the following discrete
components [8]:
• Event Generators. They collect events from outside the intrusion detection
system protected environment and present it to other components or store
it into event database both in the format of "generalized intrusion detection
objects" .
• Event Analyzers. They receive events from the Event Generators, analyze the
events statistically or compare the events against signatures or rules. Then
they provide the result to other components, or store it to even database, both
in the format of "generalized intrusion detection objects".
• Event Databases. They are the event repositories for all the components of the
system.
• Response Units. They take generalized intrusion detection objects gathered by
other components and carry out actions against suspicious events based on the
result presented by the Event Analyzers.
All four kinds of units are logical entities. A component might be implemented
as a single process on one computer or a set of distributed processes on different
computers.
Based on the needs that different IDSs may exchange data, there are two
on-going developments for IDS standards. One standard is "The Intrusion Detection
Exchange Protocol (IDXP)" , which is being developed by Intrusion Detection
Working Group under the Internet Engineering Task Force. (IETF) [7]. The other
standard is the "Common Intrusion Detection Framework (CIDF)" [8]. As of the
date of writing of this thesis, none of the two above-mentioned frameworks is widely
accepted nor accepted as a de facto standard.

CHAPTER 3
ESTABLISHMENT OF NETWORK TRAFFIC DATA WAREHOUSE
3.1 The Limitations of Current IDSs
The most widely used and commercially available IDSs are signature-based systems.
They often come with a large set of signatures that have been identified as unique
to a particular vulnerability or exploit. A signature-based system matches features
observed from the network traffic stream to the signatures hand-made by experts and
stored in its signature database. When a signature for an attack matches observed
traffic, an alert is generated, or the event is otherwise recorded [5].
Signature-based methods have some inherent limitations. The most significant
one is that a signature-based method can only detect attacks whose features have
existed in the signature database. Therefore, just like anti-virus software, signature
based IDSs cannot detect unknown attacks because there is no available signature.
But the problem is even worse, as of September 2002, there are only 2,000 IDS
signatures that have been defined, while there are more than 30,000 for anti-virus
[9]. Most IDS vendors provide regular signature updates in an attempt to keep pace
with the rapid appearance of new vulnerabilities and exploits. However, building
up the signature database is a tedious manual work, which requires comprehensive
knowledge and professional skills. Moreover it is very time consuming. This slow
manual process can neither keep pace with the advancement of new attack techniques,
nor help solve the severe problems that IDSs are currently having, such as failure
to recognize large numbers of attack variants, high probability of generating false
positive alerts and/or false negative reports and difficulty in handling overwhelming
network traffic data loads.
Based on all these factors, a feasible automated or at least semi-automated
mechanisms is greatly needed to respond quickly enough to new attacks and produce
reliable signatures for intrusion detection system.
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3.2 Data Ming and Signature Generation Framework

Data mining-based methods could be very promising candidates for automated
signature generation [10]. The major advantage of these methods is that they utilize
the generalization ability of data mining algorithms [11]. In order to detect new and
unknown attacks, a data mining-based intrusion detection system employs machine
learning and data mining algorithms on a large set of system audit data to build up
signature databases.

Figure 3.1 An Intrusion Detection Framework with Automated Data Analyzer and

Signature Generator.
Based on the needs and the above analysis, an intrusion detection framework
is proposed in this thesis as shown in Figure 3.1, the Data Capture Module, Data
Analyzer and Logger Module are implemented and Data Warehouse is established
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in this thesis. The Data Ming module and Automated Signature Generator will be
implemented in further research works.
In Figure 3.1, the IDS is placed on the external side of a monitored and
protected network, along with a Data Capture Module. The Data Capture Module
captures the network traffic data and writes the data into a raw data file in the
format of the original binary stream. Then the Data Analyzer will use network
protocol based analysis to extract information in every data field of the packets
encapsulated in the binary stream. And the Data Logger will then log the resulted
data items into corresponding positions to build up a Data Warehouse. The Data
Mining Module takes over here. It queries the Data Warehouse and applies appropriate Data Mining algorithms. The output is then sent to the Automated Signature
Generator to produce signatures, which will ultimately enhance the performance of
the Intrusion Detection System. Ideally, the whole process needs no human interference. However, in the preliminary implementations of the system, some human
interaction is still necessary.

3.3 Construction of the Data Warehouse

Under the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA [12]) and Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL [13]) sponsorship, the Information System Technology
Group at MIT Lincoln Laboratory [14] has been evaluating Intrusion Detection
Systems. Their offline data sets that were used to carry out 1998 and 1999 evaluation
have been widely accepted by researchers in the field of intrusion detection. The 1998
data sets are used to build up the Data Warehouse in this thesis.
The Data Warehouse consists of sets of network traffic databases, namely,
training data sets for the training of Data Mining algorithms and Machine Learning
mechanisms; and real data sets that the trained algorithms will work on. In these
network traffic databases, traffic stream is dissected into fields defined by corre-
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3.2 Data Ming and Signature Generation Framework

Data mining-based methods could be very promising candidates for automated
signature generation [10], The major advantage of these methods is that they utilize
the generalization ability of data mining algorithms [11], In order to detect new and
unknown attacks, a data mining-based intrusion detection system employs machine
learning and data mining algorithms on a large set of system audit data to build up
signature databases.

Figure 3.1 An Intrusion Detection Framework with Automated Data Analyzer and

Signature Generator,
Based on the needs and the above analysis, an intrusion detection framework
is proposed in this thesis as shown in Figure 3.1, the Data Capture Module, Data
Analyzer and Logger Module are implemented and Data Warehouse is established
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libpcap [15] and WinPCAP [18] Programming on UNIX/LINUX systems and Win32
systems, respectively. In the work of this thesis, MySQL 4,0 [19] is used as a crossplatform database server and MySQL Control Center 0.9,2 beta is used as client [19],
The site-specific configuration file of MySQL server is provided in Appendix B,

Figure 3.2 Tables for DARPA 98 Training Database, showing in MySQL Control
Center.
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Part of the database contents is shown in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 after the
establishment of the databases,

Figure 3.3 Contents of ICMP table in DARPA 98 Training Database, showing in
MySQL Control Center.

3.4 Implementation on NJIT's Campus Network
In order to test the previously established procedure, all the involved modules are
placed on NJIT network to work with real network traffic data. This implementation
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Figure 3.4 Some of the captured network traffic data that are labeled as DoS attacks.
is conducted to comply with the framework proposed in Figure 3.1, with only one
exception that the data capture module is placed inside the NJIT campus network
to capture traffic data going through a certain domain, instead of the whole campus
network.
During capturing, the network traffic is also monitored by a third-party software
to calibrate the data labeling. Figure 3.4 shows part of the labeling result.
After the capturing and labeling, the traffic stream is reconstructed by Ethereal
[20]. Figure 3.5 shows this reconstruction, in which highlighted frame is previously
labeled as DoS from 128.235.34.132 to 128.248.170.138.
Under the same database structure used for the training set, the DARPA 98
Datasets, the captured network traffic data are logged into the database called
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Figure 3.5 Reconstructed network traffic by Ethereal[20] showing real DoS attacks.
"realdata". In this database, the targeted traffic information can be retrieved in
many ways. For example, by carefully comparing the TCP ports and time stamps,
all the traffic between host 128.235.34.132 and host 128.248.170.138 can be
found, weather it is normal or malicious, as shown in Figure 3,6. These databases
now contain valuable information to feed data mining algorithms in further research
works.
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Figure 3.6 Real DoS attack packets between host 128.235.34.132 and host
128.248.170.138 in the NJIT Network Traffic Database.

CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

In this research, a workable preliminary procedure has been established to build up
the network traffic data warehouse, which thus forms the basis of the automated
intrusion detection signature generator.
It has to be pointed out that the data analyzer and logger used in this research
is still very crude. It only dissects IP, TCP, UDP and ICMP data streams. More
protocol analysis modules need to be added. The database schema also needs
improvement for this matter. It will be great news for researchers in the field of
Intrusion Detection if Ethereal is rendered database connectivity, given the fact that
Ethereal can dissect more 200 protocols as of the time of writing this thesis [20].
Fighting against network intrusion is such a charming yet extremely challenging
job that it demands prolonged enthusiasm and continuous hard working. It is
obviously true that the more people pay attention to security issues, the safer the
Internet would be.
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APPENDIX A
MAJOR NETWORK PROTOCOLS
A.1 Internet Protocol

Figure A.1 shows an Internet Protocol version 4 packet is embedded in an Ethernet
Frame, which is indicated in the Frame Type field with a hexadecimal value 0080.
In the IP packet, IP header occupies the first 20 bytes of space (top five rows in
the figure). There have been some changes in the meaning of data fields since the
Internet Protocol was established. For example, Time to Live now means "how
many hops (routers) the packet can pass before it expires (dropped by the system
that receive it). Protocol field is a very informative; it implies what kind of data is
embedded after IP header. A decimal value of 17 means it is UDP; 6, TCP and 1,
ICMP.

Figure A.1 IP packet format and ethernet packet format, IP packet is encapsulated

in an ethernet packet.
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A.2 User Datagram Protocol
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) is a connectionless, unreliable transport service. It
does not provide mechanism to ensure connection. It does not acknowledge. It
does not re-order the received packets. It may lose or duplicate data packets during
transmission. Further more, it has no error messaging functions to inform the upper
layer applications or to request a re-send from the sender. It is the duty of the
application program, which employs UPD at transport-layer, to ensure the quality
of service.
Even though having these unreliable features, UDP is still widely used by
many applications such as IP phone applications and online multimedia services
that demand speed more than stability. UDP is faster than TCP because it has
much less overhead and simpler procedures to transfer data. An embedded UDP
packet is shown in Figure A.2.

Figure A.2 UDP packet format, UDP packet is encapsulated in an IP packet, which
is encapsulated in an ethernet packet.
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A.3 Transmission Control Protocol
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is a reliable connection-oriented protocol
employed by many applications that require stable connections between two hosts
to ensure correct data transfer. TCP guarantees the reliability by the following
mechanisms:
• TCP uses unique sequence numbers to identify the data sent to destinations.
• TCP uses acknowledgement numbers to inform the sender which exact data
has been received. Acknowledgement numbers are generated by adding 1 to
the corresponding sequence number.
• TCP uses three-way handshake procedure to establish a exclusive unicast
connection between two hosts.
Figure A.3 shows the organization of a TCP packet. SYN flag is used at
startup to establish the connection. FIN flag is used to terminate the existing
connection.

Figure A.3 TCP packet format, which is encapsulated in the same way us UDP is
shown in Figure A.2.

APPENDIX B
SITE SPECIFIC CONFIGURATIONS
B.1 MySQL Configuration
MySQL 4.0 configuration used in this thesis is shown in Figure B,1. In order to
avoid system configuration conflicts with Windows 2000, "localhost" is used as the
bind-address, instead of the real IP address of the server,

Figure B.1 Local host MySQL server configuration for MySQL 4,0 running on
Windows 2000 Professional.
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B.2 Snort Configuration

The snort configuration file is included in below. It is modified according to the
default setting of Snort 2.0. This configuration has been tested on Windows 2000
with MySQL 4.0 in the given environment.

#################################
# The Snort Configuration File
#################################
var HOME_NET any
var EXTERNAL_NET any
# List of DNS servers
var DNS_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of SMTP servers
var SMTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of web servers
var HTTP_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of sql servers
var SQL_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# List of telnet servers
var TELNET_SERVERS $HOME_NET
# Ports you run web servers on
var HTTP_PORTS 80
# Ports you want to look for SHELLCODE on.
var SHELLCODE_PORTS !80
# Ports you do oracle attacks on
var ORACLE_PORTS 1521
# Path to the rules files
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var RULE_PATH c:/snort/rules
# Configuration for preprocessors
preprocessor frag2
preprocessor stream4: detect_scans, disable_evasion_alerts
preprocessor stream4_reassemble
preprocessor http_decode: 80 unicode iis_alt_unicode double_encode
iis_flip_slash full_whitespace
preprocessor rpc_decode: 111 32771
preprocessor bo: -nobrute
preprocessor telnet_decode
preprocessor conversation: allowed_ip_protocols all, timeout 60,
max conversations 32000
# The output plugin used for MySQL database
output database: log, mysql, user=pengfu password=12345678
dbname=realdata host=localhost
port=3306 sensor_name=<nobody>
# Include classification & priority settings
include c:\snort\etc\classification.config

# Include reference systems
include c:\snort\etc\reference.config

# Include rule sets
include $RULE_PATH/bad-traffic.rules
include $RULE_PATH/exploit.rules
include $RULE_PATH/scan.rules
include $RULE_PATH/finger.rules
include $RULE_PATH/ftp.rules

23

include
include
include
include
include
include
include

$RULE_PATH/telnet.rules
$RULE_PATH/rpc.rules
$RULE_PATH/rservices.rules
$RULE_PATH/dos.rules
$RULE_PATH/ddos.rules
$RULE_PATH/dns.rules
$RULE_PATH/tftp.rules

include
include
include
include
include
include
include

$RULE_PATH/web-cgi.rules
$RULE_PATH/web-coldfusion.rules
$RULE_PATH/web-iis.rules
$RULE_PATH/web-frontpage.rules
$RULE_PATH/web-misc.rules
$RULE_PATH/web-client.rules
$RULE_PATH/web-php.rules

include
include
include
include
include
include
include
include
include

$RULE_PATH/sql.rules
$RULE_PATH/x11.rules
$RULE_PATH/icmp.rules
$RULE_PATH/netbios.rules
$RULE_PATH/misc.rules
$RULE_PATH/attack-responses.rules
$RULE_PATH/oracle.rules
$RULE_PATH/mysql.rules
$RULE_PATH/snmp.rules

include
include
include
include

$RULE_PATH/smtp.rules
$RULE_PATH/imap.rules
$RULE_PATH/pop3.rules
$RULE_PATH/pop2.rules

include
include
include
include

$RULE_PATH/nntp.rules
$RULE_PATH/other-ids.rules
$RULE_PATH/experimental.rules
$RULE_PATH/local.rules

APPENDIX C
CODE SAMPLES

The code listed here contains two parts. Part one is a basic network packet
dumper, and part two is a basic data logger engine. Both parts are written in C
Language. Based on the assumption that users of the code have basic knowledge
about C, network, and MySQL C API, only the core routines are shown for better
understanding, all the other unnecessary details are omitted. If any problem
is encountered, refer to Reference [15], [18] and [19] for a more comprehensive
description.

C.1 A Basic Network Traffic Dumper

/*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Copyright information coming with LibPcap library
Copyright (c) 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997
The Regents of the University of California. All rights
reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
without modification, are permitted provided that the following
conditions are met:
1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following
disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials
provided with the distribution.
3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
software must display the following acknowledgement:
This product includes software developed by the Computer
Systems Engineering Group at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory.
4. Neither the name of the University nor of the Laboratory
may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
this software without specific prior written permission.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS
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*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

"AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING,
BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY
AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO
EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED
AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING
IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

*/
/*necessary "include"s*/
#include <pcap.h> /*the libpcap library header*/
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
/*necessary declarations*/
int main(int argc, char* argv){

pcap_t *packet; /*the packet capture descriptor*/
pcap_dumper_t * _datafile; /*pointer to he datafile that
the data will be written into*/
char interface_name[16]; /*name of the network interface
on the host*/
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; /*buffer for error messages*/
int snaplen; /*maximum number of bytes to capture in a packet*/
int promisc; /*flag to determine if the interface is
in promiscuous mode or not*/
int to_ms; /*read timeout in milliseconds*/
char datafile[32]; /*the datafile that captured packets
will be written into*/
int count; /*number of packets that are designated to capture*/
int packetnumber; /*number of packets read
during a live capture*/
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/*First, pcap looks up the network interfaces
on which it will capture packets*/
if(!(interface_name=pcap_lookupdev(errbuf))){
fprintf(stderr, "Error Message, %s\n",
interface_name, errbuf);
exit(1);
}

/*Open the network device interface to capture packets*/
if(!(packet=pcap_open_live(interface_name, snaplen, promisc,
to_ms, errbuf))){
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot open network interface %s: %s\n",
interface_name, errbuf);
exit(1);
}

/*Open the dump device to write captured packet
data into a datafile*/
if((_datafile=pcap_dump_open(packet, datafile))==NULL){
fprintf(stderr, "cannot open datafile!\n")
exit(1);
}

/*pcap_dispatch() is used to collect and process packets
on the openned interface. Then it passes the collected
packets to pcap_dump(), which will out the packets to
the saved datafile. pcap_dispatch() will return when
the number of count packets have been collected. instead
of using pcap_dispactch(), we can also use pcap_loop()
in the similar way.*/
if((packetnumber=pcap_dispatch(packet, count, &pcap_dump,
(u_char *)_datafile))<O){
fprintf(stderr, "cannot capture packets on interface %s:",
interface_name);
exit(0);
}

pcap_dump_close(_datafile); /*saved data file is closed*/
pcap_close(packet); /*packet descriptor openned by
pcap_open_live() is closed*/
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C.2 A Basic Network Traffic Data Logger Engine
/*
* The same copyright information as listed above

*
*
*
*
*
*

The following is a sample data logger with connectivity to
MySQL. It reads the saved data file previously dumpped by the
data capture engine, it then logs into the MySQL database
server running on localhost, and then inserts the data items
into relavent tables.

*/

/*necessary "include"s*/
#include <pcap.h> /*the libpcap library header*/
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <mysql.h> /*MySQL C API headers*/
#include <my_global.h> /* MySQL C API header*/
/*necessary declarations*/
int main(int argc, char *argv ){
pcap_t *packet; /*the packet capture descriptor*/
pcap_dumper_t * _datafile; /*pointer to he datafile that
the data will be written into*/
char interface_name[16]; /*name of the network
interface on the host*/
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; /*buffer for error messages*/
int snaplen; /*maximum number of bytes to capture in a packet*/
int promisc; /*f lag to determine if the interface
is in promiscuous mode or not*/
int to_ms; /*read timeout in milliseconds*/
char datafile[32]; /*the datafile that captured
packets will be written into*/
int count; /*number of packets that are designated to capture*/
int packetnumber; /*number of packets read*/
struct pcap_pkthdr *packet_header; /*packet header*/
u_char* packet_data; /*pointer to packet data*/
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char* host_name = "localhost"; /*server host (default==localhost)*/
char* user_name = "pengfu"; /*user name (default == login name)*/
char* password = "12345678"; /*password(default == none)*/
unsigned int port_num = 3306; /*default mqsql port number*/
char* socket_name = NULL; /*socket name (use build-in value)*/
char* db_name = "realdata"; /*database name (default == none)*/
unsign int flags = 0; /*connection flags
(0 when no connection option chosen)*/
MYSQL *connection; /*pointer to connection handler*/
char* query;
/* prototype function that handles the operations on MySQL
database. mysql_db() also serves as the callback function
called by pcap_loop()*/
void mysql_db(MYSQL *, u_char *);
/*prototype function that handles the insertion on MySQL
database. it returns 0 when succeeds, otherwise fails*/
int myInsert(char *, u_char *);
/*pcap_open_offline() opens a saved file, presents it
for reading if pcap_open_offline()fails, it returns NULL*/
if((packet=pcap_open_offline(argv[1], errbuf))==NULL){
fprintf("cannot open file Yo s\n", argv[1]);
exit(1);
}
/*when pcap_loop() finds packets (returns positive integer)
or there is no error occuring (returns zero), packet data is
inserted into the relational database*/
while((packetnumber=pcap_loop(packet, count, &mysql_db, NULL))>=0){
/*pcap_next() reads the next packet
and returns a pointer to data in that packet*/
if((packet_data=pcap_next(packert, packet_header))==NULL){
fprintf("Error: %s\n", pcap_geterr(packet));
exit(1);
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mysql_db(connection, packet_data){
/*initialize the connection handler*/
if((connection = mysql_init())==NULL)1
fprintf(stderr, "fail to initialize the connection\n");
I;
/*this function connects to the mysql server.*/
if((mysql_real_connect(connection, host_name, user_name,
password, db_name, port_name,
socket_name, flags))==NULL){
fprintf(stderr, "fail to connect to mysql server:\n%s",
mysql_error(connection));
mysql_close(connection);
exit(1);
}

/*This is a customly defined insert function
that inserts packet data into database*/
if(!myInsert(query, packet_data)){
fprintf(stderr, "insertion failed\n%s",
mysql_error(connection));
exit(1);
}

I;
}

/*if other query are demanded, the following function
can be used to conduct the query.
however, mysql_real_query() must be used here because
captured data is in binary format, which contains '\0'
character.*/
if(!mysql_real_query(connection, query, strlen(query))){
fprintf(stderr, "query failed \n%s", mysql_error(connection));
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/*connection to mysql server is closed*/
mysql_close(connection);
/*packet descriptor openned by pcap_open_offline() is closed*/
pcap_close(packet);
return 0;
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